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The Electoral College’s
Obsolescence:

Intro:
The current voting system implemented in the
United States via the Constitution utilizes an
Electoral College to elect the president and vicepresident. With the exception of Maine and
Nebraska, currently under this system the states hold
popular elections that determines how their share of
the Electoral College will vote. A state’s number of
electoral votes is determined by the combined
number of representatives they have in Congress.
Thus, despite the appearance of voting for the
president, a citizen’s vote actually goes toward
selecting the composition of their state’s Electors.
The presidential candidate who wins more than half
of the Electoral College’s votes (270 out of 538
votes) wins the presidency.
In the United States Supreme Court’s 2019
term, the Court decided on the cases Chiafalo v.
Washington and Colorado Department of State v.
Baca each of which looked at the role that the
presidential Electors play in this process. The Court
further restricted the ability for Electors to exercise
autonomy with their votes, essentially limiting their
roles to that of a body of liaisons whose votes go
toward their state’s popular vote winner regardless of
their own preferences. Chiafalo and Baca provide
evidence that the electoral college’s function has
become obsolete, differing vastly from its supposed
original intent that allowed the Electors to vote for
the candidate whom they believed most meritorious
and deserving of the presidency.

Background:
The 2016 presidential election was only the
fourth contest to feature an elected president who
won the Electoral College while losing the popular
vote. Relevant here are three Electors from
Washington, Peter B. Chiafalo, Levi Jennet Guerra,
and Esther Virginia John, and one from Colorado,
Michael Baca, who were each penalized for breaking
state laws that punished so-called “faithless Electors,”
or Electors who vote contrary to their state’s pledge to
vote for their state’s popular vote winner. In
Washington, Chiafalo, Guerra, and John were each
fined $1,000 on December 29, 2016 for breaking
Washington’s state law and “failing to vote for the
nominee of their party” (Pet. For Certiorari Chafalo,
12). In similar fashion, Baca broke his pledge to vote
for Clinton and instead attempted to vote for John
Kasich. However, unlike the Washington Electors
whose votes still counted toward the electoral college,
under Colorado law, Baca’s vote was subsequently
replaced with an Elector’s ballot that was “properly
cast… for Clinton” (Pet. For Certiorari Colorado, 4).
The Washington and Colorado Electors sued
their states to contest these restrictive pledge laws
that disabled and punished the discretion they
practiced in the 2016 election. In their reply to
Washington’s brief opposing the Supreme Court’s
intervention, the Washington Electors stated that their
“primary motive [was] to insist that a state has no
power to fine (or remove) electors for failing to vote
one way or another” (Reply in Support for Writ of
Certiorari, 11). While their legal reasoning for the
pursuit of litigation stemmed from their effort to
prevent restrictive state laws barring Elector
discretion, the Electors’ pursuit of faithless votes
stemmed from their desire to prevent Donald Trump
from becoming the next president. The Electors
intended to use the discretionary powers that they
believed they possessed to achieve this.
The faithless Electors challenged their
punishments in court, with the Washington Electors
reaching the Supreme Court of Washington and
Michael Baca reaching the Tenth Circuit Court. These
courts reached differing decisions regarding the
power states can wield over their presidential
Electors. Ultimately, the US Supreme Court granted
certiorari to reconcile the differing conclusions
reached by the two lower courts (Chiafalo v.
Washington, 7). By granting certiorari, the Supreme
Court agreed to decide what the true role of an
Elector is, whether they have discretion when they
vote, and whether states have the power to punish
Electors who break their pledge.

Above: the 2016 Electoral map note the various faithless
votes (Maine’s “red” vote is not a faithless vote)

Historical Interpretation of Electors:
The historical interpretation of the Constitution, the period
surrounding its ratification, as well as previous Supreme Court
decisions are vital to understanding the arguments produced by the
states, faithless Electors, and the Supreme Court. To briefly summarize
the states and faithless Elector arguments:
Faithless Electors’ argument:
Hamilton’s Federalist 68 explains that Article II, Section 1 gives
presidential Electors discretionary voting power
The pledges Electors take are not enforceable by law, replicating
protections afforded to Congressmen under the Speech and Debate
Clause
• A pledge constitutes a moral obligation not punishable by
law (Oral Argument of L. Lawrence Lessig, 14-15)
No faithless vote has ever been rejected and there have been over
180 anomalous votes (Consolidated Opening Brief for Presidential
Electors, 46-47)
Dictionary definitions from the time period define “vote” to mean a
discretionary action that cannot be controlled (Consolidated
Opening Brief for Presidential Electors, 27)
States’ argument:
The faithless Electors’ reliance on Federalist 68 causes them to
overlook the fact that the Constitutional Convention decided only
the methodology of selecting the Electors, not if they have
discretion (Briefs for South Dakota and 44 States and The District
of Columbia as Amici Curiae in Support of Colorado and
Washington, 8)
Instead of focusing on the few faithless votes, the votes produced
by faithful Electors reveals that they do not have discretionary
voting power (Brief for Respondent State of Washington, 36)
The dictionary definitions provided by the faithless Electors only
go so far to describe the role of Electors
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With these arguments considered, the Supreme Court’s decision looked
to resolve the dispute. In fact, the Supreme Court used its own
interpretation of the historical functioning of the Electoral College to
come to its decision. This decision is important in understanding the
true role of the Electors.

SCOTUS’ Decision:
The Supreme Court decision, which concluded that the states
have the power to curb Elector discretion through the punishment of
faithless Electors, can be summarized as:
•

•
•
•

The proliferation of the two-party system led to the contemporary
Electoral College, specifically after the passage of the Twelfth
Amendment
• Led to popular voting in states and the presidential
candidates appearing on ballots instead of the presidential
Electors
• Electors would promise to vote for their party’s candidate
since the “Nation’s first elections” (Chiafalo v Washington,
15)
Neither Article II nor the Twelfth Amendment explicitly prohibit
a state from punishing a faithless Elector (Chiafalo v.
Washington, 13)
A vote does not require discretion to be considered as one
(Chiafalo v. Washington, 12)
Noting the pocket veto cases and select writings of James
Madison, whenever there is interpretative uncertainty, the
Constitution’s true meaning can be derived from historical
practice (Chiafalo v. Washington, 13)
• Elector discretion not part of historical practice

Thus, states can now mitigate any unpredictability inherent with an
Electoral College riddled with discretionary Electors. Electors are
now accountable to the voters of their states and as such the electoral
preferences of their states can be protected.

Because the role of the presidential Electors
now deviates from the Hamilton model, where
Electors were given discretionary voting powers for
the president, the Electoral College can be even better
understood as an institution that weights every states
vote. Note that it already did before Chiafalo and
Baca, but now that an Elector’s vote is fully
understood to represent the votes of their state, the
problems already observed with an Electoral College
are exacerbated. For instance, in 2016:
• One Electoral vote in New York accounted for
approximately 260,000 voters
• One Electoral vote in Wyoming accounted for
approximately 81,000 voters
As indicated above, a person’s vote in Wyoming
holds more sway than one’s in New York.
Additionally, the Electoral College counts only
the votes of a state’s popular vote rather than the
popular vote of the nation at large. This is despite the
fact that the executive is a representative for the
entire United States unlike their Congressional
counterparts who work in DC on behalf of the
constituents in their states. Thus, the votes of a state’s
losing party hold no weight for a position that is
meant to represent the entire country.
It is therefore necessary to reform the
methodology of electing the president, especially
after the decisions in Chiafalo and Baca because
without Elector discretion, the argument for an
Electoral College makes even less sense.

Bibliography:
Brief for Respondent State of Washington,
Washington, [publisher not identified], 2020,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/
19-465/139629/20200401140652396_19465_bs_State.pdf
Briefs for South Dakota and 44 States and The
District of Columbia as Amici Curiae in
Support of Colorado and Washington,
Washington,[publisher not identified], 2020,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/
19465/141203/20200408161330330_Colorado%
20Brief.pdf
Chiafalo v. Washington, 591 U.S. ___, 2020,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/
19-465_i425.pdf
Consolidated Opening Brief for Presidential
Electors, Washington,[publisher not
identified], 2019,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/
19-465/134567/20200302120308025_19-46519-518ts.pdf
Oral Argument of L. Lawrence Lessig On behalf of
the Petitioners, Washington, Heritage
Reporting Corporation, 2020,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments
/argument_transcripts/2019/19-465_c0n2.pdf
Petition for Writ of Certiorari for Chiafalo v.
Washington, Washington,[publisher not
identified], 2016,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/
19-465/118334/20191007154112674_19_PetitionForAWritOfCertiorari.pdf
Petition for Writ of Certiorari for Colorado v. Baca.
Washington,[publisher not identified], 2016,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/
19518/119162/20191016143100621_Colorado%
20Cert%20Petition.pdf
Reply In Support of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,
Chiafalo,[publisher not identitfied], 2019, 11,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/
19-465/123441/20191122155547768_19465ReplyInSupportOfPetitionForAWritOfCerti
orari.pdf
“2016 Election Results,” Photograph, 270towin, n.d.,
https://www.270towin.com/2016_Election/

